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PENDENT PARTY JURISDICTION DENIED IN ABSENCE OF REQUISITE
JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT
National Insurance Underwriters v. Piper Aircraft
Corporation, 595 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1979)
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in National Insurance Under-
writers v. Piper Aircraft Corporation,1 determined that federal courts in
diversity cases may not exercise pendent party jurisdiction over pen-
dent claims not meeting the requisite jurisdictional amount.
Plaintiff insurer, National Insurance Underwriters, issued a hull in-
surance policy to an aircraft owner. After an accident damaged the
aircraft, plaintiff indemnified the owner in the sum of $11,000, subro-
gating itself to any cause of action held by the insured arising out of the
accident.2 The insured agreed to pay the plaintiff $7,000 for release of
the subrogation rights.3 Although the insured never paid the plaintiff
the agreed upon amount, it did settle a claim against the plane's manu-
facturer, the manufacturer's insurer, and the latter's claims agent.4 The
plaintiff, alleging diversity jurisdiction,5 brought seven alternative
claims in negligence and contract against the manufacturer, the claim's
agent of the manufacturer's insurer, the manufacturer's insurer, and the
owner's attorney to enforce its subrogation rights.6 The claims against
the manufacturer7 and the agent of the manufacturer's insurer8 met the
amount in controversy requirement. The claims against the manufac-
1. 595 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1979).
2. Id. at 547.
3. Id.
4. Shortly after settling the claim for $12,223.59, the insured aircraft owner filed for bank-
ruptcy. Id.
5. The claims alleged jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976), which provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state
are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, . . . as plaintiff and citizen of a State or of different States.
Id.
6. Two of these claims contained allegations against one defendant, an officer and agent of
the insured, but the trial court dismissed them and they were not at issue on appeal. 595 F.2d at
547.
7. Plaintiff sued the manufacturer, Piper Aircraft Corporation, for products liability and
breach of warranty and prayed for relief in the sum of $11,000. Id.
8. This claim, against United States Aviation Underwriters, alleged negligence for failing to
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turer's insurer? and the owner's attorney' ° did not.
Although denying relief on the claims that satisfied the amount in
controversy requirement, the district court found all defendants jointly
and severally liable in negligence for failing to protect the plaintiff's
subrogation interest and awarded the plaintiff $7,000."1 On appeal, the
defendants argued that even though complete diversity existed, 12 the
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the claims against
them did not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and held: Federal
courts may not exercise pendent party diversity jurisdiction over parties
against whom the claims do not meet the amount in controversy re-
quirement of Section 1332.
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction permits federal court disposition
of state claims' 3 brought with a claim alleging proper federal subject-
matter jurisdiction. Originally, the doctrine applied only to state
claims, not to additionalparties, in cases premised on federal question
subject-matter jurisdiction.' 4 Analysis of the evolution of pendency be-
assure the execution of the settlement agreement and for failing to pay plaintiff its subrogation
interest. The plaintiff alleged damages in the sum of $11,000. Id.
9. Plaintiff alleged that Aetna, the insurer of Piper, negligently failed to pay plaintiff its
subrogation interest and requested $7,000 in damages. Id.
10. The owner of the aircraft hired an attorney to execute the settlement agreement. The
plaintiff alleged that the attorney breached his contract by failing to conclude the settlement agree-
ment, and in the alternative acted negligently in failing to carry out the agreement. Each claim
sought $7,000 in damages. Id.
11. Id.
12. In Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), the Supreme Court required com-
plete diversity--diversity between each plaintiff and each defendant-to satisfy the intent of the
statutory forerunner to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1976). But see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire,
386 U.S. 523 (1967) (complete diversity not a constitutional requirement; doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction requires only minimal diversity). See also Borror v. Sharon Steel Co., 327 F.2d 165
(3d Cir. 1964) (permitting a claim against a non-diverse plaintiff under the doctrine of pendent
party jurisdiction).
13. The term "state claim," as used in the context of pendent jurisdiction, refers to those
claims without independent federal subject-matter jurisdiction. A "federal claim," on the other
hand, is one that fulfills the statutory requirements of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(1976) provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $ 10,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, except that no
such sum or value shall be required in any such action brought against the United States,
any agency, thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.
Id.
Pendent jurisdiction applied, however, only to the adjudication of state claims necessary for the
disposition of the federal question. Chicago Great W. Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1924)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss2/10
Number 2] PENDENT PARTY JURISDICTION 499
gins with Osburn v. Bank of the United States.1  In Osburn the Bank of
the United States brought suit in a federal district court challenging
(once jurisdiction established, authority vests "to determine all questions involved, including
questions of state law .... "); Lincoln Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250 U.S. 256, 263
(1919) (once jurisdiction acquired. court may decide all issues in suit challenging utility rate ordi-
nance on constitutional and state law grounds); Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 194
(1905) (deciding challenge to state railroad rate-fixing statute by statutory interpretation without
reaching constitutional objections); Rumbaugh v. Winifrede R.R., 331 F.2d 530, 539 (4th Cir.
1964) (state wrongful discharge action cognizable when brought with a claim under the Railway
Labor Act); Hazel Bishop, Inc. v. Perfemme, Inc., 314 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1963) (jurisdiction over
registered trademark infringement action and pendent claim of unfair competition); UMW v.
Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52, 60 (6th Cir. 1959) (deciding state claim of unlawful con-
spiracy to injure business in suit alleging secondary boycott in violation of Labor Management
Relations Act); Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 543 (2d Cir.
1956) (jurisdiction over unfair competition claim joined with trademark infringement claim under
the Lanham Act).
15. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). The first use of the term "pendent jurisdiction" actually
followed Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933), in Best & Co. v. Miller, 67 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y.
1946), afJ'd, 167 F.2d 374 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 818 (1948).
Congress recognizes the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1976), which
provides: "[tlhe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim
of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the copyright, pat-
ent, plant variety protection, or trade-mark laws." Id. The Reviser's note states:
Subsection (b) is added and is intended to avoid "piecemeal" litigation to enforce
common-law and statutory copyright, patent, and trade-mark rights by specifically per-
mitting such enforcement in a single civil action in the district court. While this is the
rule under Federal decisions, this section would enact it as statutory authority. The
problem is discussed at length in Hum v. Oursler ...
Id.
See. e.g.. Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 437 F. Supp. 956, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (trademark
infringement claim and claim under state dilution statute); Sims v. Western Steel Co., 403 F.
Supp. 450, 453 (D. Utah 1975) (patent infringement action brought with state claim for breach of
license), rev'd on other grounds, 551 F.2d 811 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 858 (1977); Schul-
man v. Huck Finn, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 853, 857 (D. Minn. 1972) (holding jurisdiction over related
unfair competition claim against pendent party defendant), aft'd, 472 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1973).
See genera'ly J. MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CODE % 0.03(23)
(1949) (statute expands Hum by not requiring identical facts for pendent claims); Barron, The
Judicial Code. 1948 Revision, 8 F.R.D. 439, 442 (1949) (not an extension or limitation of ancillary
jurisdiction); Bernstein, Pendent Unfair Competition Jurisdiction in Patent, Trademark and Copy-
right Cases, 2 PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. OF RESEARCH & EDUc. 418 (1958) (expanding the scope
of Hurn); Galston, An Introduction to the New Judicial Code, 8 F.R.D 201, 205-06 (1949) (codifies
effect of Hurn); Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal
Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1031 (1962) (a legislative reaction to "the restrictive application
Hurn had been receiving in this area."); Note, Problems of Parallel State and Federal Remedies,71
HARV. L. REV. 513, 516 (1958) (statute perhaps broader than Hurn because it substituted the
words "related claim" for "same cause of action"); Note, The Doctrine of Hum v. Oursler and the
New Judicial Code, 37 IOWA L. REV. 406, 419 (1952) (legislation has failed to codify Hum fully
and avoid piecemeal litigation).
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Ohio's attempt to collect taxes from it. 6 Chief Justice Marshall held
that federal jurisidction was proper "when a question to which the judi-
cial power of the Union is extended by the Constitution, forms an in-
gredient of the original cause. . . although other questions of fact or of
law may be involved in it."' 7 Thus, a court of original jurisdiction has
the power to decide all the questions presented in the case. Marshall
found support for this conclusion in the language of the Constitution
granting jurisdiction over "cases," not "questions."' 8
Slier v. Louisville & Nashville 1. . Co. 1 subsequently expanded the
Osburn doctrine. Siler involved an action to enjoin enforcement of a
Kentucky Railroad Commission order fixing intrastate rates, on the
grounds that the order was not authorized by state law and was uncon-
stitutional.20 The Court held that the question whether the state statute
violated the Constitution gave the district court proper federal question
jurisdiction. Once the district court had jurisdiction it "had the right to
decide all the questions in the case, even though it decided the Federal
questions adversely to the party raising them, or even if it omitted to
decide them at all, but decided the case on local or state questions
16. Osburn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 740-44 (1824). The chal-
lenge rested on supremacy clause grounds.
17. Id. at 823.
18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls; - to all Cases of Admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies between two or more
States; - between a State and Citizens of another State; - between Citizens of different
States; - between Citizens of the same States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
The Constitution empowers Congress to establish lower federal courts as courts of limited juris-
diction. Not only must the lower courts meet Article III, § 2 limitations, but Congress must also
specifically vest them with power to adjudicate claims. The court in Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S, (3
How.) 236 (1845) stated:
mhejudicial power of the United States, although it has its origin in the Constitution, is
(except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this court) dependent for its
distribution and organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action
of Congress, who possess the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the
Supreme Court) for the exercise of the judicial power, and of investing them with juris-
diction either limited, concurrent, or' exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from
them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the
public good.
Id. at 245.
19. 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
20. Id. at 190-91.
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only."2 This rule permits the court to decide issues on state grounds,
avoiding when possible constitutional decisions, and it results in one
lawsuit, instead of two.
22
In Hum v. Oursler23 the Court extended the pendency rule to justify
the inclusion of state issues solely because of procedural convenience.
24
Basing its definition of jurisdiction on the concept of "cause of ac-
tion,"25 the Hum court held that if the plaintiff's case presented "two
distinct grounds," one state and one federal, "in support of a single
cause of action," the federal court has jurisdiction over the entire
case.26 Even if the federal ground is not established, the court "may
nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon the nonfederal
ground. ... "27 If the plaintiff, however, alleges "two separate and
distinct causes of action," jurisdiction exists only over the federal
"cause of action."2 The Hum test implicitly limited pendent jurisdic-
tion by precluding the joinder of additional litigants as parties exclu-
sively to the pendent claim, because such joinder would present a
separate cause of action rather than an additional ground for relief.29
21. Id. at 191.
22. M. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, H. WESCHSLER, HART & WESCHLER'S THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 922 (2d ed. 1973); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 73 (3d ed. 1976).
23. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
24. C. WRIGHT, note 22 supra at 73.
25. The Hum decision did not itself offer a specific definition of "cause of action" but cited
and quoted one offered by Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927). Hum did give two
broadly worded interpretations of cause of action. "The bill alleges the violation of a single
right .... And it is this violation which constitutes the cause of action." Hum v. Oursler, 289
U.S. 238, 246 (1933). A cause of action exists when claims "so precisely rest upon identical facts as
to be little more than the equivalent of different epithets to characterize the same group of circum-
stances." Id Cf United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62 (1933) (J. Cardozo):
A 'cause of action' may mean one thing for one purpose and something different for
another. It may mean one thing when the question is whether it is good upon demurrer,
and something different when there is a question of the amendment of a pleading or of
the application of the principle of res judicata.
Id. at 67-68.
The term had provoked much controversy before Hum, and the Hum decision did not elimi-
nate the confusion. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 19 (1928); POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES §§ 346-
56 (5th ed. 1929); Clark, The Code Cause of 4ction, 33 YALE L.J. 817 (1924); Gravit, A "Pragmatic
Donition"ofthe "Cause of.4ction"Z 82 U. PA. L. REv. 129 (1933); McCaskill, Actions and Causes
of 4ctions, 34 YALE L.J. 614 (1925); Shulman & Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations in
Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 393 (1936).
26. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Comment, Pendent andAncillar;, Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines,
Number 21
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Unfortunately lower courts found Hurn's cause of action test difficult
to apply.3" This lack of guidance resulted in lower courts formulating
their own definition of the requisite "cause of action.
3 1
Concern with the resulting inconsistencies among lower courts led to
a reconsideration of the scope of pendent jurisdiction. The Court, in
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,32 liberalized 33 Hurn's "same cause of
action" test by declaring a two part standard for determining the pro-
priety of pendent jurisdiction. The first element gave the court the
power to grant pendent jurisdiction. It required a substantial federal
claim, a "common nucleus of operative facts," and a state claim that
would ordinarily be expected to be tried in the same proceedings.3 4
The second element, judicial discretion, mandated that a court make
such a grant only when convinced that it was necessary for judicial
22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1233, 1270 (1975). See, e.g., Wojtas v. Village of Niles, 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965); Rumbaugh v. Winifrede R.R., 331 F.2d 530 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964); New Orleans Public Belt Rys. v. Wallace, 173 F.2d 145 (5th Cir.
1949); Pearce v. Pennsylvania, 162 F.2d 524 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 765 (1947); Rosenthal
& Rosenthal, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 259 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Grautreau v.
Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 255 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. La. 1966); Maher v. Newton Creek Towing Co.,
190 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
30. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).
31. See, e.g., Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 215 (6th Cir. 1961) ("sub-
stantially identical facts"); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447, 454 (9th Cir. 1956) ("same set of
facts"); Strachman v. Palmer, 177 F.2d 427, 430 (Ist Cir. 1949) ("facts ... practically identical");
Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Aba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 641
(1942) ("substantial identity between the proof"); United Indus. Corp. v. Nuclear Corp. of
America, 237 F. Supp. 971, 975 (D. Del. 1964) ("substantial overlapping testimony").
32. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
33. For cases reading Gibbs as "liberalizing" Hurn see Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217,
1220 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'dinpart, rev'dinpart, sub nom. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693
(1973); Morse Electro Products Corp. v. S.S. Great Peace, 437 F. Supp. 474, 484 (D.N.J. 1977).
More recently the Supreme Court read Gibbs as "expanding" Hurn. Aldinger v. Howard, 427
U.S. 1, 12 (1976). At least one scholar describes Gibbs as abandoning the Hurn test. C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER, O.E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567 at 456 (1975).
34. [The] limited approach [in Hurn] is unnecessarily grudging. Pendent jurisdiction, in
the sense ofjudicialpower, exists whenever there is a claim "arising under [the] Constitu-
tion, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority ... " U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, and the relationship between that claim
and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court com-
prises but one constitutional "case." The federal claim must have substance sufficient to
confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court .... The state and federal claims must
derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to
their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the
federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.
383 U.S. 715, 725 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants.3 5 The Court noted
that needless decisions of state law should be avoided.36 Gibbs" liberal-
ization of the Hum test has greatly expanded the application of pen-
dent jurisdiction, 7 and in a subsequent decision, Hagans v. Lavine,38
the Court encouraged the hearing of pendent claims.3 9
Pendent jurisdiction as present in Hagans, Gibbs, and Hun involved
the joinder of separate state and federal claims, but the parties involved
were the same in each claim. The concept of "pendent parties"
emerged slowly.4" Leading the way, the Second Circuit held that an
admiralty claim against one defendant supported pendent jurisdiction
of a state claim against another defendant.4 The concept of pendent
party jurisdiction over federal question42 and diversity cases43 found
35. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
36. Id.
37. Some circuits even suggested the avoidance of diversity through the exercise of pendent
party jurisdiction. See, e.g., Beautytuft, Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1122, 1128 (6th Cir.
1970); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1974). But Sf.
Fawor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977) (in diversity cases courts may not entertain
pendent claims against nondiverse third-party defendants).
38, 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
39. The Court said:
[Ilt is evident from Gibbs that pendent state law claims are not always or even almost
always to be dismissed and not adjudicated. On the contrary, given advantages of econ-
omy and convenience and no unfairness to litigants, Gibbs contemplates adjudication of
these claims.
Id. at 545.46. See Seid, The Tail Wags the Dog: Hagans v. Lavine and Pendent Jurisdiction, 53 J.
URB. LAW 1 (1975).
40. See, e-g., Bowers v. Moreno, 520 F.2d 843, 846-48 (lst Cir. 1975); Florida E. Coast Ry. v.
United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1193-96 (5th Cir. 1975); Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516, 519-20 &
n.7 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974); Schulman v. Huck Finn, Inc., 472 F.2d 864,
866-67 (8th Cir. 1973); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809-11 (2d Cir.
1971); Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627, 629-30 (2d Cir. 1971); Shannon
v. United States, 417 F.2d 256, 263 (5th Cir. 1969); Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149,
153-55 (3d Cir. 1968).
The Ninth Circuit has, however, adopted the position that pendent jurisdiction permits joinder
of claims, not joinder of parties. See, e.g., Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978); Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), afl'd in part,
rev'd in part, sub nom. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d
136 (9th Cir. 1969). See also notes 72-75 and accompanying text infra.
For support of the Ninth Circuit's position see Oritz v. United States, 595 F.2d 65, 70 & n.8 (Ist
Cir. 1979); Tucker v. Shaw, 308 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
41. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
42. Eg., Bowers v. Moreno, 520 F,2d 843 (1st Cir. 1975); Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United
States, 519 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1975); Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 995 (1974); Manges v. Camp, 474 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1973); Schulman v. Huck Finn, Inc.,
472 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1973); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971);
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favor with more of the lower courts. The question of pendent party
jurisdiction came before the Supreme Court in Moor v. County of Ala-
meda," but the dismissal of the pendent claims permitted the Court to
bypass the issue of pendent parties, an issue the Court characterized as
a "subtle and complex question with far-reaching implications. 4
5
Aldinger v. Howard46 finally placed the issue of pendent party juris-
diction squarely before the Court. Aldinger involved a suit joining a
civil rights claim against county officials with a state law claim against
the county itself.47 Plaintiff could attain jurisdiction over the county
only if pendent party jurisdiction existed,48 because "persons" liable
Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, sub nona. District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d
627 (2d Cir. 1971). Patrum v. City of Greensburg, 419 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir. 1969), cer. denied, 397
U.S. 990 (1970); Shannon v. United States, 417 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1969); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d
94 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1974); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Craton, 405
F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1968).
43. See e.g., Niebuhr v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 486 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1973); Nelson
v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1971); Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir.
1969); Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hospital, 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968); Wilson v. American Chain
& Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966).
Under special circumstances the courts have shown a willingness to exercise pendent party ju-
risdiction to avoid the jurisdictional amount requirement. The courts tend to exercise such juris-
diction more readily if party plaintiffs are relatives, see, e.g., Wiggs v. City of Tullahoma, 261 F.
Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1966) (claims by two minor sisters for less than $10,000, with claims by five
members of same family satisfying the amount requirement); Raybould v. Mancini-Fattore Co.,
186 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Mich. 1960) (plaintiff brings action for personal injuries, and as adminis-
trator for wrongful death of his wife, the latter claim limited by state statute to less than $10,000),
if party defendants are relatives, see e.g., Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968) (plaintiff
brought action against daughter-in-law and grandson, failing to satisfy the amount requirement as
to the latter), and if defendants are numerous insurance companies, see, e.g., Stiles Contracting
Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1970) (claims against two of three insurers fail to
satisfy the amount in controversy requirement); Beautytuft, Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass'n, 431 F.2d
1122 (6th Cir. 1970) (exercising pendent jurisdiction over 24 defendant insurers when claims
against 34 defendant insurers fulfilled the $10,000 requirement).
In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973),
courts now apply a strict construction of the amount in controversy requirement.
44. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
45. Id. at 715.
46. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
47. Aldinger "decide[d] only the issue of so-called 'pendent party'jurisdiction with respect to
a claim brought under §§ 1343(3) and 1983. . . .[I]n this case Congress has by implication de-
dined to extend jurisdiction over a party such as Spokane County." 427 U.S. at 18-19 (emphasis
added).
48. Jurisdiction over the county was perhaps possible under § 1331, but plaintiff failed to
raise the issue and relied instead on § 1343. See 427 U.S. at 4 n.3.
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under judicial interpretations of the 1871 Civil Rights Act49 and its ac-
companying jurisdictions statute5" excluded counties." The Court held
that pendent party jurisdiction may exist only if "Congress in the stat-
utes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication negated
its existence."52 The Aidinger Court backed down from formulating an
"all-encompassing jurisdictional rule," noting that the proper approach
was to define what Gibbs did and did not decide and to apply those
principles to Aldinger.5 3 The Gibbs standard, stated the Aldinger
Court, was based upon an interpretation of federal judicial power
under Article III clearly justifiable because "Congress had not ad-
dressed itself by statute to this matter."54 The question of impleading a
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law
to be commenced by any person:
(I) To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of the depriva-
tion of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, by any act done in further-
ance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42;
(2) To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or to aid in preventing
any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowledge were about to
occur and power to prevent;
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of
the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Con-
gress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
51. 427 U.S. at 17. Aldinger relied on Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-91 (1961), and
Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511-13 (1973) in excluding counties from the "persons" answera-
ble under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Ironically, the Supreme Court overruled its decision in
Monroe two years after deciding Aldinger. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978). In Monellthe Court held that "persons" include local governments for the purposes of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The Court, by its decision in Monell, overruled its substantive holding in
Aldinger.
52. 427 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 13.
54. Id. The Court stated:
Gibbs and its lineal ancestor, Osborn, were couched in terms of Art. III's grant of
judicial power in "Cases ... arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and [its] Treaties," since they (and implicitly the cases which linked them) repre-
sent inquiries into the scope of Art. III jurisdiction in litigation where the "common
nucleus of operative fact" gave rise to nonfederal questions or claims between the par-
ties. None of them posed the need for a further inquiry into the underlying statutory
grant of federal jurisdiction or a flexible analysis of concepts such as "question,"
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new party, the Court noted, was both factually and legally distinguisha-
ble from Gibbs. The Court held that the joinder of the county as an
additional party for the purposes of a pendent claim was beyond the
power of the district court." Thus, Aldinger requires a federal court to
base its grant of pendent jurisdiction on an examination not only of its
Article III power, but also of implied and express statutory limits.5 6
The Aldinger Court's willingness to define the scope of pendent juris-
diction in terms of the source of the federal court's power, constitu-
tional or statutory, is consistent with both earlier and more recent
decisions. In Zahn v. International Paper Co. 5 1 the Court rejected fed-
eral jurisdiction in a class action because not all members of the class
action met the amount in controversy requirments.5 It ruled that even
though the named plaintiffs' claims met the $10,000 requirement, they
could not represent members whose claims did not. 9 Subsequently in
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,60 the Court refused to apply
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction6' to circumvent the congressio-
"claim," and "cause of action," because Congress had not addressed itself by statute to
this matter. In short, Congress had said nothing about the scope of the word "Cases" in
Art. III which would offer guidance on the kind of elusive question addressed in Osborn
and Gibbs: whether and to what extent jurisdiction extended to a parallel state claim
against the existing federal defendant.
Id.
55. Aldinger requires that in addition to satisfying the Gibbs two-pronged test, a court must
determine and satisfy the statutory limitations imposed by Congress. See notes 103-04 infa and
accompanying text. But see notes 66-68, 105-07 infra and accompanying text.
56. National Ins. Underwriters v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 595 F.2d 546, 548 (10th Cir. 1979).
57. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
58. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). But cf. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc.
v. Carey, 438 F. Supp. 440, 445 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)(reading Zahn as presaging the decision in
Aldinger and yet not denying ancillary jurisdiction in absence of requisite amount in controversy).
See also note 43 supra.
59. In Zahn the plaintiffs alleged jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1976). See also
Osbahr v. H & M Constr. Inc., 407 F.Supp. 621, 623 (N.D. Iowa 1975); Freeman v. Gordon &
Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 398 F.Supp. 519, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); United Pacific/
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Lewiston, 372 F.Supp. 700, 704 (D. Idaho 1974). But of. Uniroyal, Inc. v.
Heller, 65 F.R.D. 83, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Zahn applies only in multiple plaintiff context).
60. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
61. Ancillary jurisdiction permits the court to adjudicate an entire controversy despite the
fact it lacks independent federal subject matter jurisdiction over claims among parties. These
parties must have interests necessarily affected by a federal decision. "The ordinary concern was
not economy or convenience, but rather to provide an immediate forum for the party not in court
by his own choice." Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of Two
Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1263, 1267 (1975) (emphasis added)(footnote omitted). The exer-
cise of ancilliary jurisdiction usually involves defects in subject-matter jurisdiction in cross-claims,
counterclaims, and contribution and indemnity cases. See generally Note, The Evolution and
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss2/10
Number 2] PENDENT PARTY JURISDICTION
nally mandated requirement 62 of complete diversity. 63 The Court in
Owen construed congressional reenactments of the citizenship require-
ment as negating federal subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of
complete diversity.' Those reenactments demonstrated to the Court
the importance of the dual statutory limitations.65
Aldinger did recognize that other statutory grants of jurisdiction and
other claims might, however, permit pendent party jurisdiction.66 In
particular the Aldinger Court indicated the propriety of exercising pen-
dent party jurisdiction in cases that arise under an exclusive jurisdic-
tion statute67 because the federal forum offers the only opportunity to
Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018
(1962); Note, Kroger v. Owen Equipment & Erection Co.: Radical Departure from Traditional
Jurisdictional Concepts?, 23 S.D.L. REV. 499 (1978); Note, Rule 14 Claims and Ancillary Jurisdic-
tion, 57 VA. L. REV. 265 (1971).
62. "Whatever may have been the original purposes of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction,
this subsequent history clearly demonstrates a congressional mandate that diversity jurisdiction is
not to be available when any plaintiff is a citizen of the same State as any defendant." 437 U.S. at
373-74 (footnotes omitted). See also note 18 supra, notes 99-100 infra and accompanying text.
63. See note 12 supra. See also Ireland, Entire Case Removal Under 1441(c).- Toward a Uni-
fied Theory of Additional Parties and Claims in Federal Courts, II IND. L. REV. 555 (1978).
64. 437 U.S. at 373. See J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.71 [41 (2d ed. 1979). But see S.
REP. No.1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1958); H. R. REP. No.1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958);
Comment, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 127, 147 n.107 (1977); note 48 supra. But cf. Wilson v. American
Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966) (pendent jurisdiction destroying diversity); Borror
v. Sharon Steel Co., 327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964) (same); Campbell v. Triangle Corp., 336 F.Supp.
100 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (same).
In Owen the Court followed its earlier decision in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1969).
In Snyder the Court held that reenactments of the amount in controversy requirement, in light of
case law interpreting congressional intent as prohibiting the aggregation of claims, precluded the
abandonment of the aggregation doctrine. Thus, the Court in two cases before the Tenth Circuit's
decision in National Insurance Underwriters relied on congressional reenactments to discern con-
gressional intent.
65. 437 U.S. at 373. See notes 102, 105 infra and accompanying text.
66. The Court recognized that suits arising under exclusive federal subject-matter jurisdic-
tion, as in tort claims against the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976), might permit the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction. See note 69 infra.
67. Congress vests exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction in the federal courts under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333(1) (1976)(admiralty and maritime cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976)(bankruptcy proceedings);
28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1976)(patent and copyright cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976)(suits against the
United States); 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1976)(suits against members of diplomatic missions); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1355 (1976)(fines, penalties, and forfeitures under Acts of Congress); 28 U.S.C. § 1356
(1976)(seizures not within admiralty or maritime jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1364 (1976) (actions
against insurers of members of diplomatic missions); 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (1976)(actions pursuant to
the Tariff Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1976)(antitrust actions); 15 U.S.C. § 78(aa) (1976)(actions
under the Securities Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C. § 717(u) (1976)(actions under the Natural Gas Act);
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adjudicate all of the claims together.68 The Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals followed this approach in Transok Poieline Co. v. Darks.6 9 Tran-
sok involved a federal action for condemnation of Indian lands7° and a
pendent state claim against non-Indian cotenants. The court permitted
the pendent party claim because only the federal forum offered an op-
portunity to try all of the claims in one proceeding.7'
The Ninth Circuit, prior to Aldinger, had refused to recognize consti-
tutional power to entertain claims against pendent parties.72 In Ayala v.
United States,73 decided after Aldinger, the Ninth Circuit indicated its
continued constitutional objections. Despite exclusive subject-matter
jurisdiction74 in Ayala, the court refused to entertain the pendent claim
25 U.S.C. § 357 (1976)(condemnation of Indian lands under State laws); 40 U.S.C. § 270(b)
(1976)(actions under the Miller Act). See also note 94 infra.
68. 427 U.S. at 18.
69. 565 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978). Other courts have also
applied the Aldinger dictum exercising pendent party jurisdiction in cases arising under exclusive
subject-matter jurisdiction statutes. Compare Transok Pipeline Co. v. Darks, 565 F. 2d 1150, 1155
(10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978)("[O]ut case is similar to the test discussed in
Aldinger, under § 357, there is exclusive jurisdiction in federal court to try the federal claim,
whereby there can be a trial of all of the claims only in federal court.") and Aldinger:
Other statutory grants and other alignments of parties and claims might call for a differ-
ent result. When the grant ofjurisdiction to a federal court is exclusive, for example, as
in the prosecution of tort claims against the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1346, the
argument ofjudicial economy and convenience can be coupled with the additional argu-
ment that only in a federal court may all of the claims be tried together.
427 U.S. at 18 (footnote omitted) with National Ins. Underwriters v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 595 F.2d
546, 550-51 (10th Cir. 1979) ("This is not a situation where the plaintiff can only bring all of his
claims in federal court because of an exclusive grant of jurisdiction, as in Transok Pipeline Co.
• . . Thus, one of the stronger arguments for allowing pendent party jurisdiction is not available
here.")(citation omitted). See also note 94 infra.
70. 25 U.S.C. § 357 (1976) provides: "Lands allotted in severalty to Indians may be con-
demned for any public purpose under the laws of the State or Territory where located in the same
manner as land owned in fee may be condemned, and the money awarded as damages shall be
paid to the allottee."
71. 25 U.S.C. § 357 (1976) vests exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts. See notes 66-69
supra.
72. See note 40 supra.
73. 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). The case involved
damages resulting from an explosion of bomb laden box cars. Plaintiffs brought tort claims
against the United States, as owner of the explosives, and against Pullman, the manufacturer of
the box cars.
74. Plaintiffs brought their action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1976). In their action against Pullman some plaintiffs satisfied the
subject-matter jurisdiction requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) (diversity of citizenship), the
remaining plaintiffs attempted to gain jurisdiction as pendent parties.
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on grounds that it lacked constitutional power to do so. 75 The Ninth
Circuit remains the only circuit to adopt this restriction.
In National Insurance Underwriters v. Pier Aircraft Corporation,76
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied Aldinger in deciding
whether it had jurisdictional power to hear pendent party claims that
failed to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement of its diversity
jurisdiction. The court, assuming arguendo that the claim satisfied the
Gibbs test,77 addressed the nature of the nonfederal claim to determine
whether Congress, in the language or history of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, had
negated the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.78 The court relied upon
Owen 79 and Zahn8 ° to make its determination of congressional intent.
Reviewing Owen's interpretation of the legislative history of the diver-
sity statute," the court considered it as dispositive of the congressional
intent to negate pendent jurisdiction in cases in which the amount in
controversy was not satisfied. To further support its narrow interpreta-
tion of the amount in controversy requirement, the court turned to
Zahn. The court noted that if the Zahn Court had found no subject-
matter jurisdiction over parties voluntarily entering the federal forum,
it should dismiss claims against party defendants involuntarily brought
before a federal forum. 2 The court implied that subject matter juris-
diction depends on the nature of the "power" conferred upon the fed-
eral judiciary by Congress, not on the discretionary exercise of the
"judicial economy, convenience, and fairness" principles.83
75, 550 F.2d at 1199-1200.
76, 595 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1979).
77. Id. at 550.
78, d.
79, See notes 60-65 supra and accompanying text.
80. See notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
81. 595 F.2d at 550. The court stated that Owen:
[s]ets forth two obvious requirements for the existence of diversity jurisdiction. Con-
gress, in enacting "amount in controversy" minimums, with the changes therein on reen-
actments over the years, has demonstrated its view of the importance of these limits. As
the Court said in Owen Equipment, referring to the reenactments of the citizenship re-
quirement, "this subsequent history clearly demonstrates a congressional mandate that
diversity jurisdiction is not to be available when any plaintiff is a citizen of the same
State as any defendant." Here, this "subsequent history" of reenactment as to the dollar
amount must lead us to the same conclusion. Thus, under Owen Equioment, plaintiff's
claims against these defendants, for amounts less than $10,000, cannot be supported ju-
risdictionally by the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.
Id.
82. 595 F.2d at 550. But see Uniroyal, Inc. v. Heller, 65 F.R.D. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Zahn
applies only in multiple plaintiff context).
83. National Ins. Underwriters v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 595 F.2d 546, 549-50 (10th Cir. 1979).
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In reaching its decision the court found no difficulty in distinguishing
its earlier decision in Transok Poeline Co. v. Darks.s4 In Transok Poe-
line the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal claim existed exclu-
sively in the federal courts, 85 suggesting that Congress neither
impliedly nor expressly negated pendent jurisdiction in that case.8 6 In
National Insurance Underwriters the Tenth Circuit emphasized the
availability of the state courts as an alternative forum for resolving all
claims in one suit. 87 Because the federal courts had no power to adju-
dicate the pendent claims, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff.88
National Insurance Underwriters reflects the trend, encouraged by
Aldinger, toward redefining the scope of pendent party jurisdiction.
Gibbs expanded the scope of federal jurisdiction to encompass state
claims in federal question cases,89 claims against nondiverse parties in
diversity cases, 90 and state claims in cases brought under a variety of
exclusive federal jurisdictional statutes.9 Aldinger, however, directed
that the federal courts not circumvent statutory limitations on jurisdic-
tion. The holding in National Insurance Underwriters responds to this
reservation.
The need for a reexamination of the scope ofjudicial power to define
jurisdiction stems from a concern that the federal judiciary must re-
spect its institutional role within the federal system.92 The existence of
parallel state and federal remedies, so that one's exercise of judicial
84. 565 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1977).
85. See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
86. Id.
87. National Ins. Underwriters v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 595 F.2d 546, 550-51 (10th Cir. 1979).
88. Id. at 551.
89. See note 42 supra.
90. See cases cited in note 64 supra. But Gf Grimes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 841
(2d Cir. 1977) (holding that pendent party jurisdiction destroyed diversity).
91. See note 67 supra.
92. See Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201,213 (6th Cir. 1961) ("unless we are
to abandon altogether any concept of a dichotomy of federal and state jurisdiction. . . it is clear
that a line must be drawn somewhere to mark the limits of federal jurisdiction"); Strachman v.
Palmer, 177 F.2d 427,433 (1st Cir. 1949) (Magruder, J., concurring) ("federal courts should not be
overeager to hold on to the determination of issues that might be more appropriately left to settle-
ment in state court litigation"); Frank, Historical Basis of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 22-28 (1948); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial
Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 225 (1948). But see generally Wechsler, mra at 225-26
("amount in controversy has no place in judging the propriety of the original jurisdiction in any
case involving rights asserted under federal law").
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power necessarily denies the other's opportunity to adjudicate, presents
a major concern of federalism.9 3 Although concepts of "judicial econ-
omy, convenience, and fairness" expanded the scope of pendent juris-
diction under Gibbs,94 those concepts, when considered in light of the
93. See Note, Problems ofParallel State andFederal Remedies, 71 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1958).
See general), ALl, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURT (1965).
94. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726. See Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction:
Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1262, 1272-74 (1975).
Some courts have held that considerations of convenience and economy do not extend beyond
plaintiffs with parallel remedies for the same wrong. See, e.g., Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th
Cir. 1969); Anthony v. Cleveland, 355 F. Supp. 789 (D. Hawaii 1973); Letmate v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R., 311 F.Supp. 1059 (D. Md. 1970); Tucker v. Shaw, 308 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1970);
Maher v. Newton Creek Towing Co., 190 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
The "fairness" criterion affects the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in cases arising under exclu-
sive federal subject-matter statutes.
For cases arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976) see, e.g., Morse Electro Prods. Corp. v. S.S.
Great Peace, 437 F. Supp. 474 (D. N.J. 1977) (pendent claims permitted among various defend-
ants); Princess Cruises Corp., Inc. v. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Cal. 1974)
(pendent party jurisdiction).
For cases arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1976) see, e.g., Astro Music, Inc. v. Eastham, 564 F.2d
1236 (9th Cir. 1977) (pendent unfair competition claim); Knickerbocker Toy Co., Inc. v. Faultless
Starch Co., 467 F.2d 501 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (validity of copyright as pendent claim); Astro-Honor,
Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 197 1) (pendent party jurisdiction), rev'd on
other grounds, 551 F.2d 811 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 858 (1977).
For cases arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976) see, e.g., Dick Meyers Towing Serv., Inc. v.
United States, 577 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1978) (pendent jurisdiction over private party); Murphey v.
United States, 451 F. Supp. 544 (D. D.C. 1978) (pendent party jurisdiction extending over the
District of Columbia); Maltais v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 540 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (pendent juris-
diction over private party). But c/ Kack v. United States, 570 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1978) (pendent
jurisdiction does not apply to additional party absent independent subject-matter jurisdiction);
Mickelic v. United States Postal Serv., 367 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (pendent jurisdiction
does not apply to lessor of post office).
For cases arising under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) see, e.g., Gerecht v. American Ins. Co., 344 F.
Supp. 1056 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (pendent contract claim despite absence of diversity); Metropolitan
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of New York v. East Brooklyn Say. Bank, 319 F. Supp. 393 (E.D.N.Y.
1970) (pendent unfair competition claim even when federal antitrust claim dismissed).
For cases arising under 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(a) (1976) see, e.g., Hidell v. International Diversified
Inv., 520 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1975) (pendent state securities law permitted even after federal claim
dismissed).
For cases arising under 15 U.S.C. § 78(aa) (1976) see, e.g., Hidel v. International Diversified
1150 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978) (pendent claims against non-Indian coten-
ants).
The "fairness" criterion also affects the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in situations where a
unity of action exists such that the failure to exercise federal jurisdiction over the pendent party
claim will prejudice one of the parties. See, e.g., Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1401 (5th Cir.)
(noting the propriety of exercising jurisdiction where there exists "almost complete interdepen-
dence ... [of] proof' arising out of landlord's installation of two-way mirror in bedroom and
bathroom of couple), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 842 (1974); Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415
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policies inherent in federalism, now ironically support a narrowing of
the doctrine. Requiring a litigant to defend a state claim in federal
court that-except for the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction-lacks
power to adjudicate the claim, raises a clear question of fairness.95 Na-
tional Insurance Underwriters seems to speak to this concern by imply-
ing that if all of an action's claims can be adjudicated in a state court,
that forum best serves the goal of efficiency implicit in pendent jurisdic-
tion.96
National Insurance Underwriters, although accurately following the
Supreme Court's application of Aldinger in Owen, demonstrates the
limitations of Aldinger's reasoning when applied to other jurisdictional
grants. Aldinger mandated that federal courts determine whether Con-
gress "negated" pendent jurisdiction under the applicable jurisdictional
statute.97 It applied previous judicial interpretations of the statutory
provisions to conclude that Congress actually intended the statutory
limitations to bar access by the pendent party to a federal forum. 98 The
Supreme Court in Owen applied Aldinger's reasoning to determine the
necessity of complete diversity under Section 1332. 99 In looking at stat-
utory reenactments it held that the "subsequent history clearly demon-
strates a congressional mandate that diversity jurisdiction is not to be
available" absent complete diversity."o Devoid of the prior interpreta-
tions of congressional intent present in Aldinger, however, this analysis
appears to require the affirmative fulfillment of the statutory require-
ments to gain access to the federal forum. Thus, in essence, the Court
requires congressional affirmation-not "negation" 01-- of pendent
party jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit in National Insurance Underwrit-
F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969) (success of wife's claim for lost consortium of $9,999.99, depended on
success of husband's claim for personal injuries); Fahrner v. Gentzsch, 355 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (exercising jurisdiction, despite plaintiff's son destroying complete diversity, because of state
law requiring claims of parents and minors to be enforced in one action).
95. In exclusive federal jurisdiction cases, requiring the splitting of claims between federal
and state forums might unfairly burden the plaintiff, possibly placing a remedy beyond his means.
But when the additional party defendant would not otherwise be subject to suit in the federal
forum, exercising pendent jurisdiction might unfairly burden him. See Note, UMW v. Gibbs and
Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. REv. 657, 664 (1968).
96. 595 F.2d at 551.
97. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
98. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
99. See notes 60-65 supra and accompanying text.
100. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978), quotedin National Ins.
Underwriters v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 595 F.2d 546, 550 (10th Cir. 1979).
101. Courts nevertheless express the inquiry into congresssional intent in terms of "negation,"
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ers focused, as required by Owen, on statutory reenactments of Section
1332's jurisdictional amount requirement. °2  The Court's ruling
demonstrated the limitations of the Aldinger-Owen approach. Here the
congressional reenactments hardly show congressional intent to bar ac-
cess to the courts, because the reenactments do not exist in light of sub-
stantive case law interpreting congressional intent as in Aldinger.103
Rather, the reenactments exist-in light of substantial case law recogniz-
ing the validity of pendent jurisdiction. °4
The Tenth Circuit recognized that in cases arising under exclusive
federal jurisdiction courts may apply less stringent requirements."0 5
Aldinger indicated that in granting exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction
Congress exercises its authority" to allocate judicial power between
the federal judiciary and the state courts by precluding the assertion of
parallel remedies in nonfederal forums."0 7 Thus, the less stringent test
of congressional "negation," rather than affirmation, suffices.'0 8 In
see 595 F.2d at 550 ("there still remains the question whether Congress has expressly or impliedly
negated pendent party jurisdiction").
102. See note 50 supra. See also National Bank & Trust Co. of South Bend v. United States,
589 F.2d 1298 (7th Cir. 1978) (must inquire into intent of Congress when exercising pendent
jurisdiction); 3A J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 18.07 [1.41 (2d ed. 1974); C. WRIGHT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 23 (2d ed. 1970); Comment, Aldinger v. Howard
and Pendent Jurisdiction, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 127, 146-47 (1977); Note, Developing Governmental
Liability Under 42 U.S. C § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1207 (1971) (too speculative "[itlo deter-
mine what Congress would have thought had it been thinking about something it was not").
103. See notes 64-65 supra and accompanying text.
104. See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
105. 595 F.2d at 550-51. See also notes 67-71 supra and accompanying text.
Although the court in National Ins. Underwriters indicated that congressional negation of pen-
dent party jurisdiction depended on the language of the statute "or legislative history," 595 F.2d at
550, the opinion is void of any legislative history. The court, following the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Owen and Snyder, relied solely on congressional reenactments. For a discussion of more
traditional methods of statutory interpretation, see generally W. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS
(1975); Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333 (1976).
106. See notes 46-56 supra and accompanying text.
107. Where the jurisdiction-conferring claim is a federal question over which state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction-for example civil rights and general federal questions-
fairness does not demand that both actions be brought in the federal forum, though
judicial economy may. However, when the jurisdiction-conferring claim must be
brought in federal court, both claims may be heard in the same forum only if pendent
jurisdiction is exercised. In these cases, the rationale favoring settlement of all issues in a
single forum is most convincing.
Bowers v. Moreno, 520 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1975) quoting Comment, Federal Pendent Subject Matter
Jurisdiction-The Doctrine of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs Extended to Persons Not Party to
Jurisdiction-Conferring Claims, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 165 (1973).
108. See Morse Electro Prods. Corp. v. S.S. Great Peace, 437 F. Supp. 474, 485 (D. N.J. 1977)
("the prohibition set forth in Aldinger should not be extended . . . [to a case] within exclusive
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such cases the Gibbs requirements, as applied to pendent party jurisdic-
tion, limit pendent party claims to those normally expected to be liti-
gated with the exclusive federal claim. The combination of
congressional allocation of judicial power through exclusive jurisdic-
tional statutes, together with the Gibbs limitations, eases federalism
concerns by insuring that federal courts remain "courts of limited juris-
diction."109
By requiring affirmative statutory authority, National Insurance Un-
derwriters effectively requires federal subject-matter jurisdiction over
each and every party," ° unless the plaintiff may only bring all his
federal admiralty jurisdiction. Clearly, only in a federal court could all of the claims be tried
together. There is no indication whatever that Congress implicitly or explicitly has determined
that the parties ... should not be joined"). See, e.g., cases cited in note 68 supra. See also notes
84-88 supra and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Victor Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 212 (1971) ("[t]o afford respondent a
maritime cause of action would thus intrude on an area that has heretofore been reserved for state
law"); Jorden v. Metropolitan Utils. Dist., 498 F.2d 514, 516 (8th Cir. 1974) ("District Courts of
the United States are courts of limited jurisdiction," and Congress had not empowered them to
entertain claims under the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against municipal corporation);
Commercial Sec. Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 456 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1972) ("fed-
eral courts can take cognizance of only those matters which Congress has entrusted to them by
statute"); Kuhl v. Hampton, 451 F.2d 340,342 (8th Cir. 1971) ("federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction. . . and were not established to mediate any and all types of complaints and alleged
wrongs"); Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513, 517-18 (8th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 926 (1971) ("Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only the power that
the Congress expressly has conferred upon them by statute"); Wallach v. City of Pagedale, 376
F.2d 671, 675 (8th Cir. 1967) ("Federal courts have only that jurisdiction which Congress, acting
within the limits of the Constitution, confers upon them"); Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366,
368 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001 (1964) (jurisdiction is "narrowly limited"); Kaufman v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 245 F.2d 918, 919 (3d Cir. 1957) ("it is a truism that the 'inferior' federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction"). See generally U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 1; Act of Sept. 24,
1789, 1 Stat. 73 (Judiciary Act); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART &
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURT AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 921-26 (2d ed. 1973); J. MOORE,
supra note 102 at 18.07 [1.2-1.4]; C. WRIGHT, supra note 102 at § 19; 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3567 (1975); Baker, Tolvard
a Relaxed View of FederalAncillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. PiTr. L. REV. 759 (1972);
Eisenberg, CongressionalAuthority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498
(1974); Fortune, Pendent Jurisdiction---The Problem of "Pendenting Parties, " 34 U. PITT. L. REV. 1
(1972); Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV. 262
(1968); Note, The Evolution and Scope ofthe Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts,
62 COLUM. L. REv. 1018 (1962); Note, UMW v. Gibbs andPendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. REV,
657 (1968); Note, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 220-24 (1966); Note,
Federal Pendent Party Jurisdiction and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs-Federal Question and
Diversity Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 194 (1976).
110. Accord, United States Gen., Inc. v. City of Joliet, 598 F.2d 1050, 1055 (7th Cir. 1979)
("addition of a completely new party for purposes of a state law claim ... would run counter to
the well established principle that federal courts. . . are courts of limited jurisdiction"); Ortiz v.
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claims in federal court. If claims against pendent parties in diversity
and federal question cases must satisfy the statutory requirements, such
claims must have independent subject-matter jurisdiction. This case
reflects an era of redefinition for the scope of federal judicial power and
results in the narrowing, if not near abolition, of pendent party jurisdic-
tion.
United States, 595 F.2d 65 (lst Cir. 1979) (permitted pendent jurisdiction since independent basis
of federal jurisdiction exists); Libby, McNeill, and Libby v. City Nat. Bank, 592 F.2d 504,510 (9th
Cir. 1978) ("Pendent jurisdiction ... does not reach parties for whom there is no independent
basis for federal jurisdiction"); Harris v. Steinem, 571 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1978) (permissive counter-
claims require independent jurisdictional grounds); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d
1057 (2d Cir. 1977) (permissive counterclaims require independent jurisdictional grounds); Blake
v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1977) (requiring independent federal jurisdiction).
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